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COUNTERSTATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
As a result of the trial held May 5, 1986, before the
Honorable John A. Rokich, Third District Court Judge, Henry Earl
Sartori, Appellant, has requested this Court review three issues
on appeal which Respondent would restate as follows:
1.

Was Appellant prohibited from presenting any evi-

dence to the Trial Court on the issue of which party was responsible for the dental expenses of the minor children; and, if so,
would the trial result have been different?
2.

Was Appellant restricted by the Court in presenting

any evidence on Respondent's financial circumstances and, if so,
would the trial result have been different?
3.

Was the increase in child support from $100.00 per

month to $250.00 per month after an 11 year span of time
an abuse of discretion on the facts as presented?

COUNTERSTATEMENT OF FACTS
A,

Overview; Statement of the Case,

After eight years of marriage, the parties to this
action were divorced by order of the Third District Court on
March 17, 1976.

Plaintiff/Respondent, Mrs. Spearsf was awarded

custody of the parties' two minor children who were ages three
and seven at the time of the divorce and Defendant/Appellant,
Mr. Sartori, was ordered to pay One Hundred and No/100 Dollars
($100.00) per month per child as child support.

(Decree of

Divorce appears in record, hereinafter "R" , at page 22).
The Decree of Divorce contains a provision for payment
of medical obligations which appears as follows:
"8. The Defendant is ordered to payf in addition to the child support, all medical obligations of the minor children." (R. 23)
Plaintiff's Divorce Complaint had requested that Defendant pay
"all of the medical and dental obligations of the minor children"
(paragraph 10, Plaintiff's Complaint, R. 4 ) . The record also
contains a comprehensive Stipulation between the parties, to wit:
"10. That Defendant shall pay all of the medical obligations of the minor children." (R. 18)
There are no other references in either the Complaint or the parties' Stipulation allocating the responsibility for payment of
medical or dental expenses.

Moreover, the Findings of Fact, Con-

clusions of Lawf and the Decree of Divorce itself contain no reference to dental expenses and the only provision for the health

care of the minor children is the directive in the Decree that
Defendant "shall pay all of the medical obligations of the minor
children."

(R. 18).

In August, 1985, Respondent Jeri H. Sartori Spears filed
a Verified Petition for Modification of Decree of Divorce which
requested the following relief:
(a) An increase in child support for the parties1 minor
children who were then age thirteen (13) and sixteen (16);
(b) An extension of the child support obligation for
the parties' eldest child/ Henry Sartori, Jr., to continue until
he reached the age of 19 when he would graduate from high school;
and for,
(c)

Reimbursement from Mr. Sartori for amounts expended

on behalf of the minor children, representing medical and dental
obligations from 1977 until the date of filing, which totaled
over $6,000.00.

(Respondent's Verified Petition appears at R.

24).
A hearing was held on this Petition to Modify before
Domestic Relations Commissioner Sandra N. Peuler on December 9,
1985.

At that time the Commissioner requested that both parties

submit documentary evidence in support of their position on the
medical expense issue.

Mrs. Spears submitted an itemized summary

of amounts expended by her for prescriptions, general medical expenses, and orthodontic work for the minor children from 1977
through 1985.

(R. 59-62).

Mr. Sartori submitted copies of

checks, receipts, and check registers, of which only two were
directly related to medical reimbursement during the time for
which Mrs. Spears was seeking reimbursement, and these totaled
$33.50.

(R. 66-72).

Mrs. Spears Financial Declaration showed

her only income to be child support in the sum of $200.00 per
month.

(R. 82-84).

Mr. Sartori's Financial Declaration showed

significant rental income from his ownership of rental properties, and salaried income, which together totaled $44,544.00
annual income.

(R. 85-93).

On January 14, 1986, the Commissioner ruled that Plaintiff should be granted an increase in child support for her
youngest child, Shanell, from $100.00 to $250.00 per month
beginning February, 1986.

The Commissioner also awarded

Plaintiff judgment for unreimbursed medical, dental, and orthodontic bills upon both counsel comparing their evidence of payment and achieving an exact dollar amount.

(R. 94-95).

Mr. Sartori objected to the Commissioner's recommendations and the matter was set for trial.
On May 5, 1986, a trial was held before the Honorable
John A. Rokich, whose order upheld the recommendation of the
Domestic Relations Commissioner and awarded Mrs. Spears judgment
for unreimbursed medical, dental, and orthodontic expenses in the
amount of $5,971.32; the amount of $1,000.00 in attorney's fees
and costs; and an increase in child support for the minor child,
Shanell, to $250.00 per month as of February, 1986.
115-117).

(R.

103,

The Court found that a substantial change of circumstances had been established as Mr. Sartori's income had
increased significantly from the "$800.00 per month net wages"
set forth in the Divorce Decree to his current income of over
$40,000.00 gross annual income, and further found that the expenses of raising the minor children had also increased for Mrs.
Spears.
B.

Facts on Medical-Dental Reimbursement Issue.

At the outset of the trial, the Court informed the parties and counsel that it had reviewed the pleadings and Commissioner's recommendations and was prepared to find that as a matter of law, the divorce Decree provision that Mr. Sartori pay
"all the medical obligations of the minor children" included all
of the medical and dental expenses for the minor children.

The

Court referred to the Complaint, Stipulation, and Divorce Decree
in making this statement.

(Trial Transcript, at R. 145-146).

The Court then phrased the medical expense issue for trial as a
determination of which amounts were still owed to Mrs. Spears
which had not already been paid by insurance or reimbursed by Mr.
Sartori (R. 146). During trial, Respondent, Mrs. Spears, presented evidence including checks and insurance records from 1977
through 1985, showing her payments to physicians, dentists, and
orthodontists for her children's health care needs.

Respondent's

records showed these payments had not been reimbursed by the
Appellant or any insurance provider.

Appellant, Henry Sartori,

also presented testimony and evidence to establish some reimbursement of medical payments during this time period.

At the end

of this testimony the Court determined that it would order reimbursement to Respondent of at least $3,700.00 paid for orthodontic work on behalf of the minor children, but could not
determine, on the evidence before it, what portion of the
remaining $2,500.00 of general medical expenses requested by Respondent should be paid, if any.

The Court provided counsel a

week within which to meet outside of Court to exchange evidence
on this point and determine a mutually acceptable amount for
reimbursement.

This was done, and judgment was ultimately

awarded to Respondent for $5,791.00, representing unreimbursed
expenses for medical, dental and orthodontic expenses.
C.

Facts on Child Support Increase.

Based on a review of the pleadings, the Court file and
evidence presented, the Court determined that Defendant's net
wages at the time of the divorce in 1975 was $800.00 per month
and that Appellant had a present gross annual income of over
$30,000.00.
Court.

These figures were both agreed to by counsel in open

(R. 175). Respondent, Jeri H. Sartori Spears, testified

that she was employed at the time of the divorce in 1975 as a
waitress and last worked, at this same occupation, in about 1978.
(R. 175). She also testified that she would like to work but
felt she had a "full time job taking care of my children".
195).

(R.

Respondent further testified that it had been a financial

hardship for her to pay the medical and dental bills for the
minor children without any assistance from Appellant.

(R. 176-

195).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
I
Appellant contends that the Trial Court prohibited him
from presenting evidence on the parties' Stipulation as to payment of medical and dental expenses, and further, that he was
prohibited from cross-examining Plaintiff as regards her current
employment and financial situation.

As a review of the record

reveals, there was no prohibition, limitation, or other restriction on Appellant's counsel presenting his case or questioning
witnesses.

Rather, counsel made no objection during trial to any

such limitations and has thus lost the right to raise these matters on appeal.

Further, the Court's ruling to interpret the

language of the parties' Divorce Decree referring to payment of
medical obligations, which the Court determined as a matter of
law also included dental and orthodontic expenses, is within the
sound discretion of the Trial Court and was based on competent
evidence and supported by law.
II
Appellant further argues that the Trial Court abused its
discretion in raising Appellant's child support obligation to
$250.00 per month "without any evidence other than DefendantRespondent's increased income".

There was in fact ample and sub-

stantial evidence in the record of Respondent's lack of income
and greater child-rearing expenses to support the increase in
child support as directed by the Court.

A significant body of

case law supports the Court's action which was also guided by
concepts of equity and fairness.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN RULING
THAT DIVORCE DECREE PROVISIONS REFERRING TO
"MEDICAL EXPENSES" ALSO INCLUDED DENTAL AND
ORTHODONTIC EXPENSES IN THIS CASE.
A.

The Court Had Significant Evidence and Equitable

Power to Support its Ruling.
The long-recognized standard of appellate review permits
reversal of a Trial Court only when the evidence clearly preponderates to the contrary or where the trial Court has abused its
discretion or misapplied principles of law.

Gill v. Gill, 719

P.2d 779 (Utah 1986); Wiese v. Wiese, 699 P.2d 700 (Utah 1985);
Fletcher v. Fletcher, 615 P.2d 1218 (Utah 1980).

All of the

available facts and evidence on the issue of whether these parties' intended the phrase "medical obligations" in the Divorce
Decree to also include dental, orthodontic and similar obligations was before the Court.

The Court explicitly referred

to this evidence both at the beginning and close of the trial
stating that it had read the Complaint, Decree and Stipulation of
the parties and was of the opinion that both medical and dental
expenses were meant to be included as health care costs and were

directed to be paid by Defendant-Appellant Henry Earl Sartori.
(R. 145f 225). There was also directly conflicting testimony
elicited by both parties as to what was intended by the phrase
"medical obligations".

(R. 147, 212). Appellant's counsel

called no other witnesses on the interpretation of this point and
the Court thus had before it all factual evidence on the parties'
intent.

Accordingly, the Court was in a position to then apply

its equitable powers and rules of construction to interpret the
Divorce Decree.

The Court ruled that both medical and dental

expenses were included as health care to be paid by Appellant on
behalf of the minor children.
The Court's reasoning is expressed as follows:
"I am of the opinion that I heretofore stated
that the medical and dental is included as health
care and it is not conceivable that a parent
would be required to pay the medical expenses
out of the $100.00 per month and try to raise
children on that amount....but from 1975 to 1986,
11 years, [child support] has not increased. So,
it appears to be only fair that the medical will
be paid, and particularly the orthodontic will be
paid by you, Mr. Sartori. I feel very strongly
about that. That is a health care problem that
they had..." (R. 225-226).
This is a strong and clear articulation by the Trial Court that
in the Court's view, the child support level was too low to be
intended to include payment by Mrs. Spears of the minor
childrens1 health care expenses.

A clear sense of manifest

injustice at the situation of Apellant's inadequate contribution
to his children's needs is also apparent and important to this
ruling.

B.

Appellant Failed to Timely Object or Proffer

Evidence at Trial,

In his Brief, Appellant argues that the trial

court limited his case presentation on the issue of medical/dental reimbursement.

A careful examination of the trial transcript

reveals JTO attempts by Appellant's counsel to proffer evidence on
this point or to present relevant witnesses.

Instead, Appellant

makes bold statements in his Brief that the evidence on this
point "would have included a comparison between the; divorce
Complaint, the Stipulation, Defendant's testimony and also the
testimony of Defendant's divorce attorney".

Without an

appropriate and timely objection or proffer at the trial,
Appellant cannot be allowed to accuse the Court of an abuse of
discretion and of limiting his presentation when he in fact made
no efforts to present other evidence or preserve his client's
rights.
Appellant also tries to make us believe that he had some
secret explanation for why he is only obligated to pay the medical expenses of the children and not the dental.

A careful

review of Appellant's Brief still preserves this secret as no
basis, either factual or legal, is presented to argue against the
trial court's ruling.

The testimony on this point was in direct

conflict and the documents which this Court and the Trial Court
have to review shed no light on who, other than Mr. Sartori,
Defendant-Appellant herein, is to be responsible for dental and
other health care expenses of the children.

Appellant cannot be

allowed to lay blame on the trial court for its own failure to
present a case.

Rather, the Court had before it all available

evidence on the interpretation of the divorce Decree as to medical and dental expenditures and ruled in accordance with the law
and equitable principles.
The Trial Court's ruling to include both medical and
dental expenses in the Divorce Decree language which uses the
general phrase "medical obligations" is supported by substantial
evidence and legal precedent.

In the case of Naylor v. Naylor,

700 P.2d 707 (Utah 1985), the Utah Supreme Court clarifies the
extent of a Trial Court's broad equitable discretion, stating
that it has the power to even "disregard stipulations or agreement of the parties in the first instance...and to thereafter
modify such judgments when change of circumstances justifies it,
regardless of attempts of the parties to control the matter by
contract."

700 P.2d at 710.

Thus, even if this Court had been

convinced that the parties intended to stipulate differently, it
still had the authority to override that stipulation in the interests of justice. An example of the Court's power in the area
of medical expenses and insurance is presented in the case of
Beardall v. Beardall, 629 P.2d 425 (Utah 1981).

In that case,

the Utah Supreme Court interpreted a Divorce Decree provision
providing for Defendant's payment of medical and dental expenses
of minor children whose custody was awarded to plaintiff.
Plaintiff brought a proceeding to enforce this provision and also

requested reimbursement for the medical insurance premiums
expended by her over the years on behalf of the minor children in
her custody.

The Utah Supreme Court affirmed the Trial Court's

reimbursement of these premiums stating that the premiums were
actually a necessary medical expense incurred for the children.
Similarly, the Court here has found that the orthodontic expenditures were medically necessary procedures and thus could conceivably be awarded under the explicit provision in the Divorce
Decree that medical expenses be reimbursed by Appellant.
C.

The Orthodontic Expense

Was Medically Necessary.

It was also established at trial that the minor
children's orthodontic work was medically necessary and thus
unquestionably a payment Appellant should pay under the Decree.
During the 11 years of divorce Mrs. Spears was essentially paying
all of the health care costs of the minor children which included
payment of $3,700.00 for orthodontic bills.

Mrs. Spears

testified that these orthodontic expenses were for both of the
minor children and were in fact medically necessary procedures.
She testified that it was the childrens' pediatrician who
referred them for orthodontic work and described the extreme dental condition of both children prior to this corrective work.
She testified her son Henry could not close his mouth or chew his
food and was the object of frequent teasing as a result of his
prominent teeth.

She further testified that her son would gag at

the dinner table because he could not chew properly and that it

also impaired his breathing.

These conditions also existed with

her daughter, Shannell, who had a distorted jawbone structure
which prevented her chewing and breathing properly.
165-168).

(R.

Photographs and a statement from the orthodontist con-

firmed that these orthodontic expenses were not cosmetic procedures but, rather, were medically necessary and directly related
to the childrens' health and well-being.
this finding.

The Court also made

(R. 226.)
POINT II

IT WAS NOT AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION FOR THE
TRIAL COURT TO AWARD AN INCREASE IN CHILD SUPPORT
ON THE BASIS OF A CHANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCES.
The law is clear that a party seeking a modification of
a Divorce Decree carries the burden of showing a substantial
change in circumstances.
1297 (Utah 1981).

Christensen v. Christensen, 628 P.2d

This Court has further emphasized that in mat-

ters concerning child custody and the support of children, because of their highly equitable nature, that it is appropriate
for the Trial Court to take into consideration the entire circumstances of the case and make "any adjustment" which the Trial
Court "may think fair and justified using equitable powers".
Lord v. Shaw, 682 P.2d 853 (Utah 1984).
It is unclear whether Appellant is arguing that the
threshold burden of changed circumstances has or has not been
established herein.

Rather, there is only a generalized state-

ment in Appellant's Brief that the Court was "without sufficient

information of the parties' circumstances upon which to base a
modification of the Decree."

(Appellant's Brief, page 8 ) .

Nevertheless, Appellant's main argument appears to again be a
belief that the trial court restricted his case presentation and
questioning of Plaintiff's circumstances.

Once again, a thorough

examination of the record fails to show any point where
Appellant's attorney was "prohibited" from questioning or where a
proffer of evidence or additional witnesses was made.

It is

accurate that at one point Respondent's counsel's objection to
questioning was sustained by the Court where Mrs. Spears was
being questioned on purchases her present husband made.
196).

(R.

The Court explained its ruling indicating that it was the

parties he was concerned with and their change of circumstances,
not their spouses.

This ruling has a firm basis in Utah law and

was dealt with by the Supreme Court in the matter of Kiesel v.
Kiesel, 619 P.2d 1374 (Utah 1980).

In that appeal the Court

faced the issue of whether income earned by a party's new spouse
was properly considered in a modification proceeding.

The Court

stated as follows:
"While it is true that a stranger to a divorce
action should not be constrained, by reason of
marriage, to lend financial support to his or
her spouse's children by a prior marriage, the
Court is not precluded from taking such circumstances into consideration in determining the
ability of one who does have the legal obligation of support."
619 P.2d at 1376.
In this passage, the Supreme Court is expressing the traditional
"deference to the judgment of the trial court due to its advan-

taged position".

Openshaw v« Openshaw, 639 P.2d at 178 (Utah

1981).
In facing issues presented by modification petitions,
the Courts have wide latitude to review all the circumstances of
the parties to determine whether sufficient changes have occurred
warranting modification and also to determine what precise modification should be made.

There is no dogmatic checklist for

Courts to follow to assess the circumstances in every case.

In

the case of Owen v. Owen, 579 P.2d 911 (Utah 1978) f this Court
approved the Trial Court's emphasis on the needs of the children
rather than the manner and standard of living desired by a parent
as being the proper focus of an inquiry requesting increased
child support.

In the case of Wiker v. Wikery 600 P.2d 514 (Utah

1978), this Court reviewed an increase in support in a situation
of continued illness of the custodial mother, salary increases of
the noncustodial father, and also cited the factors of inflationary trends and the lapse of time between awards as sufficient
to uphold a Trial Court's increase in support.

The Kiesel case

presented very similar facts to the case at bar, namely, an
increased income for the noncustodial father and increased medical expenses for the minor children which this Court found was
sufficient evidence to support an increased support award.
Similar facts to Respondents are also seen in Christiansen v.
Christiansen, 667 P.2d 592 (Utah, 1983), where an increased
support award was affirmed on a trial record showing only a non-

custodial father's increased income and increased expenses for
the minor childrens' child care.

Interestingly, Appellant quotes

from this case to the effect that an increase in a husband's
income does not "automatically" justify an increase in child support.

No such "automatic" view is urged by Respondent, rather

the facts of her situation present several well-established
grounds to justify the child-support increase awarded by the
court below.
In the instant case, Mr. Sartori admits that there was
evidence of his substantially increased income from $800.00 per
month at the time of the divorce in 1975 to a gross annual income
of over $30/000.00 per year at the time of trial 11 years later.
(R. 175.)

Appellant also admits in his Brief that there was no

evidence of any increased income for Mrs. Spears.

(Appellant's

Brief, page 8, line 16). There was also unquestionably evidence
before the Court as to Mrs. Spears' increased expenses regarding
the medical, dental and health care expenses of the minor
children.
period.

These alone approximated $6f000.00 during a nine-year
She also testified to substantial extra costs for her

son, Henry's special diet needs, and extra expenses (R. 163, 164,
176).

An important factor in Respondent's situation, too, is the

mere passage of time where 11 years of inflation has undercut the
value of her 1975 $100.00 per child support level.

Respondent's

unemployment and the prolonged financial hardship caused by
meeting the burden of her children's substantial medical and den-

tal expenses alone should also be considered.

These circumstan-

ces not only pass the threshold test to allow modification herein
but also provide substantial support for the amount of the
increase awarded.
The Trial Court was in fact quite explicit in explaining
its increased support award herein and appeared to view the
situation as patently unfair for far too long to PlaintiffRespondent.

Considering Mr. Sartori's $45,000.00 annual income

and the $100.00 per child support level/ the Court was clearly
offended by the notion that Mrs. Spears was entitled to no
increase.
CONCLUSION
The Trial Court did not abuse its discretion in either
interpreting the divorce Decree/ awarding increased child support/ in handling the trial, or in making rulings of law as set
forth above.

Appellant has failed to establish any error andf as

shown/ the trial court's decision is supported by ample evidence
and equitable principles, and should be affirmed.
DATED this

(&

day of March/ 1987.

/Ar/u? h'c
SUZANNE M^ftELIUS
Attorney 'for Plaintiff-Respondent
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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